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Polycentric Governance of Transit Migration: 
A Relational Perspective from the Balkans and the Middle East 
 
Abstract 
State and non-state actors interact in both formal and informal ways during 
migration governance. Yet, we know little about such interactions, especially in 
the field of transit migration, a largely regional phenomenon. Here the 
categories of migrants are fluid between refugees, regular and irregular 
migrants, including those from conflict regions. Governance takes place also 
informally. Building on relational theories in International Relations, this paper 
introduces a novel relational approach to polycentric governance. I argue that 
at the center of such governance are not simply institutions or migration 
regimes, but power-laden relations among governmental, non-governmental, 
supranational and non-state actors, as well as sending and destination states. 
These form architectures of partially official, partially informal dynamics that 
govern transit migration in a particular world region. Such architectures are 
based on mechanisms of cooperation, conditionality, containment, 
contestation, and others, combined in regionally specific ways. The mechanisms 
manifest themselves differently depending on how actors are embedded in 
places with different political regimes and statehood capacities. The paper 
illustrates this relational perspective to polycentric governance with 
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The Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees (2018) established 
comprehensive standards for facilitating safe and orderly migration. However, 
states have implemented the principles selectively. The gap between intentions 
for multilateral governance and implementation practices is especially visible in 
the field of transit migration, a regional phenomenon where interventions from 
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state and international institutions are often ineffective. Here the categories of 
migrants are fluid between refugees and regular and irregular migrants. 
Governance also takes place informally. It is problematic that we still know little 
about how formal and informal interactions among actors contribute to transit 
migration governance. How can we better understand such dynamics beyond 
the role of institutions? How can we discern and compare such dynamics in 
different world regions? 
This paper advances a relational approach to polycentric governance of 
transit migration, suited for regional analysis. There is much to be gained in the 
understanding the governance of migratory and refugee transit flows, if we 
switch from an analytical perspective focused on individual regimes to a 
polycentric perspective that considers the social interactions between actors in 
a complex governance landscape. While scholarship on migration regime 
complexes emphasizes the role of intersecting formal institutions, I argue that 
at the core of such governance are polycentric social relations among 
governmental, non-governmental, supranational, and non-state actors, as well 
as sending and destination states, forming regional governance architectures. 
These architectures include informality and do not necessarily lead to the 
emergence of rules-based institutions, as governance scholarship often thinks. 
The resulting mixture is power-laden, based on mechanisms of cooperation, 
conditionality, containment, contestation, and coercion and others, linking 
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different actors in regionally specific ways. When repeated, such relationships 
become durable structures shaping actors’ behaviour.  
This article seeks to categorize such power-laden relationships in the 
Balkans and the Middle East, two regions in the European neighbourhood with 
abundant transit migration. This piece does not feature an explanatory theory 
about transit migration governance, but a novel lens into polycentric 
governance architectures formed regionally on the basis of social relations. 
These are a solid set of formal and informal rules emerging from interactions of 
multiple actors at different scales. Reproduced relational dynamics create 
specific conditions that allow actors to respond to transit migration in a 
particular region in specific ways. Thereby this article advances the need to look 
at transit migration governance from a polycentric perspective in the first place, 
and to consider specifically a new relational way of thinking about polycentricity 
where the analysis focuses on the power-laden social relationships that bind 
different actors when governing. 
The article continues with a review of three scholarly streams: transit 
migration, international migration regimes, and regional migration governance. 
I further introduce my relational approach to polycentric governance of transit 
migration and map out the mechanisms constituting each relational link. I bring 
comparative evidence from the Balkans and the Middle East. I conclude by 
discussing the importance of analysing polycentric governance and informality 
in international migration politics.  
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Transit Migration and Transit States 
Transit migration is broadly defined as ‘migrants having the intention to 
move onwards to a third country’.1 Transit states are those that host transit 
migration. Transit migration narrowly concerns persons holding a transit visa 
but is broader in practice.2 A record 1.3 million refugees applied for asylum in 
the European Union (EU) in 2015, nearly double 1992’s high of 700,000.3 Some 
arrive as refugees but do not apply for asylum under the EU Dublin regulations 
in the first receiving state and continue on to other destinations. Refugees often 
become part of irregular migration,4 smuggled on dangerous journeys and 
vulnerable to exploitation and death in transit.5  Some labour migrants also 
have visas but overstay their time and become irregular migrants, seeking 
accommodation elsewhere. 
Some become trapped in transit states. Bottlenecks, detention centres, 
logistical problems, changing asylum systems, tightened border controls, 
hostile environments, and lack of economic, social, and legal opportunities can 
prevent refugees from moving on, and turn them into ‘stranded migrants’.6 
 
1 Marieke Wissink, Franck Düvell and Anouka van Eerdewijk. ‘Dynamic Migration Intentions and the Impact of Socio-
Institutional Environments'. Journal or Ethnic and Migration Studies 39:7 (2013), pp. 1087-105, p.1087. 
2 Maria Koinova, Maryam Zarnegar Deloffre, Frank Gadinger, Zeynep Sahin Mencutek, Jan Aart Scholte, Jens Steffek, 
‘It's Ordered Chaos: What Really Makes Polycentrism Work,’ International Studies Review, online publication, 
19/10/2021.  
3  Pew Research Center. ‘Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015,’ 16/08/2016. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-
2015/ 
4 Christina Oelgemoeller, ‘‘Transit’ and ‘Suspension’’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37:3 (2010), pp. 407-24. 
5 Philippe Fargues, ’Work, Refugee and Transit’, International Migration Review 43:3(2009), pp. 544-77.  
6 Rebecca Dowd, ‘Trapped in Transit’, UNHCR, Research Paper 156, 2008; Deniz Yükseker and Kelly Brewer. ‘Astray and 
Stranded at the Gates of The European Union’, New Perspectives on Turkey 44:44 (2011), pp. 129-60. 
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Postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe – with little immigration experience 
– host refugees and irregular migrants but resist accommodating them, creating 
incentives for further transit. Opposition to new migration flows has engulfed 
Italy, Spain, and Greece, seeking for decades to contain irregular migration. 
Libya, Morocco, and Egypt have served as transit countries with conflict-
generated migration from Africa, as has Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan for those 
fleeing the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Transit states may try to contain, 
confine, and disperse irregular migration,7 but can also informally let migrants 
move on to other places.8 
A rapidly growing scholarship sheds light on transit migration in the 
European neighbourhood. It is associated with EU’s policy of ‘externalization’, 
seeking to manage migration before it reaches its borders. 9  The EU uses 
economic and political conditionality, linking migration control in transit states 
with economic development, as in Morocco, Libya, and elsewhere in North 
Africa,10 in addition to prospects for EU integration regarding Turkey11 and the 
Western Balkans.12 Morocco and Libya, exposed to forced migration from sub-
Saharan Africa, and others like Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon exposed to flows 
 
7 Guiseppe Campesi, ‘Between Containment, Confinement and Dispersal,’ Journal of Modern Italian Studies 23:4 
(2018), pp. 490-506. 
8 Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli. ‘The Humanitarian War Against Migrant Smugglers at Sea,’ Antipode 50:30 
(2017), pp. 685-703; Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. Ebbing and Flowing. Near Futures Online 1, ‘Europe at the 
Crossroads’ 1 March, 2016, online. 
9 Michael Collyer et al. ‘Critical Approaches to Transit Migration’, Population Space and Place 18:4 (2012), pp.407-14. 
10 Hein De Haas, ’Morocco's Migration Experience’, International Migration 45:4 (2007), pp.39-70. 
11 Beste Isleyen, ’Transit Mobility Governance in Turkey’, Political Geography 62 (2017), pp.23-32. 
12 Maria Koinova and Senada Selo-Sabic, ‘The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean,’ Paper presented at the 2018 
International Studies Association annual convention, San Francisco, USA. 
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from the Middle East, manage migration as both sending and transit states.13 
Besides a controversial 2016 EU-Turkey deal to stop irregular migration towards 
Europe, similar EU ‘migration compacts’ have also been signed with Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Niger.  
Critical analyses of border regimes highlight the Eurocentric and 
securitized connotations of the term ‘transit migration’. 14  It has become a 
‘convenient euphemism for subjects that are potentially politically delicate’15 
and perceived as a threat.16 Multiple actors connect for ‘polyvocal’ interventions 
in managing irregular flows, often based on securitized discourses or everyday 
practices. 17 Aside from EU institutions and transit states, this includes non-state 
actors, such as NGOs, as well as EU citizens who perform ‘border-work’, which 
they do through ‘envisioning, constructing, maintaining and erasing borders’18 
and creating ‘vernacular’ imaginaries of border security 19  in their everyday 
lives.20 In addition, surveillance technologies are deployed at borders and via 
‘remote control’, reaching deep into states’ territories through a system of 
passports, visas, and pre-screening among passenger carriers.21 Critical studies 
further highlight that migrants and refugees are not passive recipients of these 
 
13 De Haas, ‘Morocco’s Migration Experience’; Roberto Pitea, ‘Transit Migration’, CARIM Research Reports 2010/02, EUI, 
Florence; Ahmet Icduygu and Deniz Yükseker. ‘Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey’, Population Space and Place 
18:4(2012),pp.441-456. 
14 Franck Düvell, ‘Transit Migration’, Population Space and Place 18:4 (2012), pp.415-27. 
15 Collyer et al. ‘Critical Approaches’, p. 411. 
16 Mark-Anthony Falzon, ‘Immigration, Rituals and Transitoriness in the Mediterranean Island of Malta,’ Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 38:10 (2012), pp.1661–80. 
17 Philippe Frowd, ‘Producing the ‘Transit’ Migration State’, Third World Quarterly 41:2 (2020), pp. 340-58. 
18 Chris Rumford, ‘Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe’, Space and Polity, 12:1 (2008), p. 2. 
19 Georg Löfflmann and Nick Vaughan-Williams. ‘Vernacular Imaginaries of European Border Security among Citizens,’ 
European Journal of International Security 3:3 (2018), pp. 382-400. 
20 Paolo Novak, ‘Back to Border,’ Critical Sociology 43:6 (2017), pp. 847-64. 
21 Aristide Zolberg (1997) quoted in David Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019). 
Prof. Dr. Maria Koinova, ‘Polycentric Governance of Transit Migration,’ Review of International Studies, 
accepted version, 21 October 2021 + author’s information 
 8 
policies, but actively voice, contest and seek to participate in creating more just 
terms of their governance.22 
This article addresses two major lacunae in this scholarship. First, 
although various actors are implicated in transit migration governance, 
emphasis still lies with state and international organizations. My piece aims to 
shift analytical attention away from institutional and other actors and toward 
their social relations, including informal interactions. Second, although 
governance mechanisms, such as control, containment, and dispersal, are 
identified,23 scholarship discusses their contextual implications separately, with 
evidence quite often from transit countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta, 
Morocco, Libya, Turkey, and Lebanon. Analysis does not focus on the power-
laden mechanisms underpinning the relationships among relevant actors in a 
particular region. Demonstrating how such relational governance architectures 
are built is a major contribution of this article. 
 
Migration Regimes and Regional Migration Governance  
Scholarship on international migration regimes has sought to account 
for complexity in migration governance. ‘Regime’ is often defined as the 
‘principles, norms and decision-making procedures around which actor 
 
22 Maurice Stierl, Migrant Resistance in Contemporary Europe. London: Routledge, 2019; Vicki Squire, Nina 
Perkowski, Dallal Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Reclaiming Migration, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2021.  
23 Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek, ‘Under Control? Or Border (as) Conflict’, Social Inclusion 5:3 (2017), pp. 58-68; 
Lorena Gazzotti and Maria Hagan.  ‘Dispersal and Dispossession as Bordering’ Journal of North African Studies, 
30/08/2020 online. 
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expectations converge in a given issue area’.24 The emphasis has been on how 
international legislative and policy frameworks of nation-states intersect in 
complementary or substitutive ways. Historically based on governing refugees 
and labour and post-colonial migration,25 regimes have introduced migration 
controls.26 The refugee regime has been clearly based on the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol, and the responsibility of the UNHCR to govern it, yet 
matters are more complex.27 As Loescher et al. explain, the UNHCR argues that 
‘refugees are not migrants’, and by extension transit migrants are not relevant 
here. However, in crossing borders refugees depend on multiple policies during 
their transit, including those of the International Organization of Migration 
(IOM), travel and visa regimes, and regimes related to internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), human rights, and labour migration.28 Such regime complexity 
has been theorized upon in the IR literature more broadly,29 and in migration 
governance specifically, 30  by putting emphasis on interactions between 
institutions, not on social relations. ‘Doubters’ in scholarship on migration 
regimes emphasize a top-down centralized understanding of institutions, while 
‘discoverers’ focus on place-based contextual dynamics generating governance 
 
24 Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’, International Organization 36 (1982), p.185. 
25 James Hollifield, ‘Migration and International Relations’, International Migration Review 26:2 (1992), pp. 568-95.  
26  James Hollifield, ‘The Emerging Migration State’, International Migration Review 38:3(2004), pp. 885-912; Rei 
Kozlowski (ed.). Global Mobility Regimes, (London: Palgrave, 2011). 
27 Alexander Betts, ‘Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime’, Perspectives on Politics 7:1 (2009), pp. 
53-58. 
28 Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, James Milner, ‘UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the 21st 
Century’ (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
29 Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’, Perspectives on Politics 7:1 
(2009), pp. 13–24. 
30 Alexander Betts, ‘Regime Complexity and International Organizations’, Global Governance 19 (2013), pp. 69-81. 
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effects bottom-up.31  
 These theories capture well how regimes intersect and overlap in 
governing migration, while authorities expand or contract their mandates.32 
However, they are less attentive to informality operating alongside formal 
institutions, and to the social relationships among those involved. This is where 
a polycentrism perspective becomes helpful, as it shifts focus away from legal 
and policy frameworks to interactions among various ‘centres’ that find ways to 
self-regulate while operating at different scales. This article further emphasizes 
the need to look into the power-laden social relationships that bind such 
‘centres’ durably and form governance architectures that enable or constraining 
behaviours.  
Finally, building on IR theories on regional governance, 33  migration 
scholars have demonstrated that states and international organizations 
establish interaction patterns in different world regions. The notion of a region 
gained traction after the Cold War as a meso-level field of reference,34 larger 
than the national but smaller than the international or global level.35 Regions 
can be considered geospatially, constructed discursively, or mapped onto a 
specific institutional space. I consider regions as geospatial areas characterized 
by a specific set of relationships between political and social actors involved in 
 
31 Dagmar Punter, Hasse van de Veen, Enrike van Wingerden and Darshan Vigneswaran, ‘A ‘Distributive Regime’, 
Political Geography 70 (2019), pp. 117-126. 
32 Betts, ‘Proliferation’. 
33 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds). Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
34 John Agnew. Geopolitics (London: Routledge 2002). 
35 Jessica da Silva C de Oliveira, ‘The Place of the Region in IR’, Contexto International 39:1 (2017), pp. 97-115. 
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governing migration.  
European migration governance has taken centre stage so far in these 
studies. The focus has been on the right to free movement for EU citizens, 
attempts to establish common migration and asylum policies, and cooperation 
to affect migration in other countries and regions.36 A multilevel governance 
perspective is often put forward to account for such a complex yet relatively 
well-regulated institutional and policy environment. 37  Knowledge about 
governing mobility in other regions is less advanced. Governance is found to 
occur ‘in different fora, with overlapping but incongruent memberships’,38 and 
discussed primarily from an institutional perspective. This includes recent work 
on the Economic Community of West African States, a Mercosur Residence 
Agreement in Latin America, the Eurasian Economic Union in the post-Soviet 
space, and the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).39 
The relatively new scholarship on regional migration governance has 
several shortcomings. First, most attention is on intergovernmental processes, 
capturing less the importance of NGOs and other non-state actors, especially 
those involved informally. Second, studies rarely advance a comparative 
regional perspective. In contrast, my account demonstrates how regional 
 
36 Andrew Geddes et al (eds). Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019).  
37 Peter Scholten et al ‘Multilevel Governance from Below’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44:12 (2018), pp. 
2011-33; Tiziana Caponio and Michael Jones-Correa. ‘Theorising Migration Policy in Multilevel States’, Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 44:12 (2018), pp.1995-2010. 
38 Sandra Lavenex, ‘Regional Migration Governance’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45:8 (2019), pp. 1275-93, 
p.1275. 
39 Geddes et al, ‘Dynamics’; Tamirace Fakhoury, ‘Multi-level Governance and Migration Politics in the Arab World’, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45:8 (2019), pp. 1310-26. 
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governance architectures have emerged in both the Balkans and the Middle 
East.  
 
Polycentric Governance from a Relational Perspective 
Studying transit migration governance requires analytical leverage to 
deal with complex relationships, which polycentric governance theories are well 
equipped to address. Michael Polanyi first developed the concept of 
polycentricity; he considered it a social system of decision-making centres with 
limited yet autonomous authority, operating under an overarching set of rules. 
The success of governance does not depend on any central authority, but on 
the self-organization of various ‘centres’ alongside shared rules.40 Polycentricity 
gained more attention under governance studies with Vincent and Elinor 
Ostrom’s significant work on local management of common resources, and 
especially E. Ostrom’s 2009 Nobel prize in economics. 41  Her analytical 
framework is consistent with game theoretical models considering that 
decentralized agents operate in an ‘action situation’ synonymous to a ‘game’.42  
Various studies built on these founding ideas of viewing polycentricity 
as a complex form of management comprising multiple centres of decision-
making.43 Polycentric governance has been researched in complex economic 
 
40 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951). 
41 Vincent Ostrom et al. ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas’, American Political Science Review 
55:4 (1961),pp. 831-42. 
42 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.’ American 
Economic Review 100:3 (2010), pp. 641–72. 
43 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change’, Global 
Environmental Change 20 (2010), pp. 550–57; Keith Carlisle and Rebecca Gruby. ’Polycentric Systems of Governance’, 
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systems, 44  development, 45  natural resources such as forests, 46  water, 47  and 
climate change, 48  and recently in migration. 49  In polycentric governance, 
cooperation, competition, and contestation exist among the multiple agents 
involved, but their overlapping authorities are no longer seen as a pathological 
situation. Overlapping authorities are a result of the need to have division of 
labour to deliver services, cooperate, and exchange at different scales, 
structuring the governance process. 50  
However, as argued elsewhere, much of the existing analysis primarily 
considers institutions and actors that participate in polycentric governance, 
while their social relationships’ capacity to create order has been neglected.51 I 
build on Scholte’s approach towards polycentric governance. His early ideas 
and subsequent work focused on the global realm, viewing polycentrism as 
generic patterns of multisited regulation with dispersed and trans-scalar 
character. 52  This approach is well suited for studying transit migration 
governance, requiring complex place-based solutions across various centres of 
formal and informal authority in different regions. My goal is to shed light on 
 
Policy Studies Journal 47:4 (2017), pp. 927-52. 
44 Ostrom, ‘Environmental Change’.  
45 Michael McGinnis, ‘Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance,’ Policy Studies Journal 39:1 
(2011), pp. 51-78.  
46 Harini Nagendra and Elinor Ostrom. ‘Polycentric Governance of Multifunctional Forested Landscapes’, International 
Journal of the Commons 6:2(2012), pp. 104-133. 
47Andreas Neef, ‘Transforming Rural Water Governance;, Water Alternatives 2:1 (2009), pp. 53-60.  
48 Daniel Cole, ‘Advantages of a Polycentric Approach to Climate Change Policy’, Nature Climate Change 5 (2015), 
pp.114–18; Andrew Jordan et al (eds), Governing Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
49 Illona Van Breugel and Peter Scholten. ‘Governance by Proxy’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 2019. 
DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2019.1619973. 
50 I thank a reviewer for this comment. 
51 Koinova et al, ‘It’s Ordered Chaos’, 2021. 
52 Jan Scholte. ‘Globalization and Governance’ Warwick University, CSGR Working Paper 130/04, 2004; also Frank 
Gadinger and Jan Aart Scholte, Polycentrism: How Governing Works Today (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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how power-laden mechanisms underpin relationships between the various 
actors.  
In order to do so, I further draw upon IR relational theories. They 
demonstrate that regularly repeated social interactions form relational 
structures in international politics, which in turn enable and constrain actors’ 
behaviours. Such structures can be formed through social movements, 53 
international networks, 54  or path-dependent processes. 55  The resulting 
relationships can be hierarchical or anarchical,56 fragmented or integrated,57 or 
can emerge from linkages to specific contexts.58 Configuring such relationships 
is at the core of my approach, as several mechanisms underpin what binds 
together the various actors involved in transit migration governance in a 
particular region, producing power structures that embody both formal and 
informal rules.  
I further argue that interactions among agents seeking to govern transit 
migration do not necessarily lead to rule-based institutions or initiatives, as 
governance scholarship often thinks.59 These relational architectures are much 
less institutionalized, contextually specific, and shaped by different political 
 
53 Sherrill Stroschein, Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
54  Emilie Hafner-Burton and Alexander Montgomery. ‘International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflicts’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:1 (2006): pp. 3–27. 
55  Stacie Goddard, ‘Brokering Peace’. International Studies Quarterly 56: 3 (2012), pp.501–15, Maria Koinova, 
Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
56 Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.14-
16. 
57 Paul McDonald, Networks of Domination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
58 Staniland ‘Rebellion’; Maria Koinova, Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2021). 
59 Terrence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds.), Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
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regimes – democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian – and stronger or weaker 
institutional capacities of states within a particular region. These configurations 
are often the undercurrents that offset official arrangements or become more 
or less aligned with them. Although there are clear centres of authority, such as 
transit states and international organizations, in weak and fragile states actors 
officially mandated to deal with transit migration interact with NGOs and other 
private actors in more informal ways, which when repeated form governance 
architectures that are both formal and informal. 
Regarding the mechanisms underlying these relations, I draw from  
Hedström and Swedberg who consider these as ‘analytical constructs that 
provide hypothetical links between observable events’.60 Such mechanisms can 
be isolated on the basis of their properties linking entities through different 
activities.61 Here such properties are considered the different ways power is 
exercised by different entities (‘centres’). Therefore, in this article capturing 
patterns of durably established social relationships rather than tracing causality, 
I do not treat mechanisms such as cooperation, coercion, conditionality, 
containment or contestation in causal ways, but as regularities occurring in 
specific circumstances,62 that need to be treated contextually.63 Mechanisms 
 
60 Peter Hedström, and Richard Swedberg (eds). Social Mechanisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
p.135. 
61 Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver, ‘Thinking about Mechanisms’ Philosophy of Science  67: 1 (2000), 
pp.1-25. 
62Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2005).  
63 Tulia Falleti and Julia Lynch. ‘Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis’. Comparative Political Studies 42:9 
(2009), pp.1143-66; Gary Goertz and James Mahoney. A Tale of Two Cultures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
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are formally or informally applied between actors, and political regimes shape 
how certain mechanisms are foregrounded. For example, in regions where 
authoritarian regimes dominate, mechanisms with more coercive elements 
come to the fore; in regions with democratic regimes, more consensual politics 
will be at play. How mechanisms operate should be scrutinized by empirical 
investigation,64 as I do shortly.  
I consider cooperation a social phenomenon, rather than only 
embedded in interactions among states and international organizations,65 or 
based on rational choice models of ‘interactions among egotists’. 66  It is a 
complex mix of interests, beliefs, and values that drive cooperative behavior. 67 
From a polycentric governance perspective, this entails collaboration between 
multiple parties working across boundaries to solve a common problem that no 
party can solve on their own, while sharing power without vertical hierarchies.68 
A relationship based on conditionality entails power asymmetry whereby 
one actor attaches specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to another. 
Conditionality is usually a formal intervention of international institutions, 
attaching conditions of compliance to specific policies in exchange for 
 
64 Goertz and Mahoney, ‘A Tale’. 
65 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
66 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (NY: Basic Books, 1980). Ostrom’s framework is also based on game 
theory.  
67 David Carment and Ariane Sadjied (eds). Diasporas as Cultures of Cooperation. (London: Palgrave, 2017); see also 
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membership or other benefits for recipient countries.69, Such power relations 
are asymmetric and can be underpinned by competing institutional logics of 
the actors involved.70 
In a containment relationship one actor seeks to limit the spread of 
another actor’s ideas, practices, or people, in order to protect their own 
territory. In migration governance, containment policies seek to thwart 
migrants’ autonomous movements and prevent them from spreading.71 In Italy, 
for example, containment has inspired the so-called ‘hot-spots’ approach, 
further associated with refugees’ ‘confinement’ and ‘dispersal’ in reception 
centres scattered throughout the country.72 Containment can be pursued also 
through various techniques, which Fitzgerald sums up as ‘a landscape of domes, 
buffers, moats, cages, and barbicans’ that prevent the ‘unwanted from finding 
refuge’, but become difficult to enforce once ‘a movement is channeled by 
social networks or a developed people-smuggling industry’.73 
Co-optation entails ‘significant socialization processes leading to 
conformity with and commitment to a particular set of political norms’74 and 
practices conforming to a pre-set world.75 In polycentric governance, subsidies 
and government programmes can occasionally co-opt ground-based 
 
69 Philippe Schmitter, ‘The Influence of the International Context upon Choice of National Institutions and Policies in 
Neo-Democracies.’ In Laurence Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimension of Democratisation (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp.26–54. 
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71  BiEPAG, ‘The Migrant Crisis: a Catalyst for EU Enlargement?” Policy Brief, June 2016. 
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73 Fitzgerald, “Refugee,” 2019, p.5. 
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movements. 76  Tacit toleration is an informal mechanism where one actor 
chooses to overlook the transgressions or undesirable practices of another, for 
the sake of undisclosed interest or the inability to contest. Actors can also be in 
a relationship of contestation, where policies or practices are disputed by either 
or both. Contestation in polycentric governance is essential because ‘abstract 
and underoperationalised social ideals cannot be imposed on the participants 
by an overarching authority’, but need to be ‘given content by the web of social 
actors’.77  An actor can further use the soft power of attraction rather than 
coercion or payment to achieve certain goals, 78  or engage in domestic or 
international alliance politics, either in support of or against another actor. 
Figure 1 summarizes the configurations of these mechanisms that build 
the relational architectures of transit migration governance in the Balkans and 
the MENA regions. These are based on a transit state’s relationships with: 1) 
international organizations, 2) NGOs and other private and non-state actors, 3) 
destination states, and 4) sending states. Countries in both the Balkans and the 
Middle East are sending states for large waves of emigrating citizens, but also 
transit states for refugees and irregular migrants from war-torn regions. In the 
European neighbourhood, where the Balkans and the Middle East are located, 
the EU is a major supranational organization to which transit states relate. The 
 
76 Harini Nagendra and Elinor Ostrom, “Polycentric Governance of Multifunctional Forested Landscapes’, International 
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77 Damjan Kukovec, ‘Peaceful Contestation’ in Andreas Thiel et al, eds. Governing Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019), p.210. 
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UNHCR plays an important role, as does the International Organization for 
Migration. NGOs, but also businesses, smugglers, and militants, as non-state 
actors also engage in migration governance. When migrants exercise agency, 
they can be also part of this relational dynamic. Destination states are those 
that transit migrants strive to reach. Sending states are their original home 
states. These power-laden relationships bind these four sets of actors in an 
architecture of transit migration governance. While my approach does not 
exclude that ad hoc relationships may form in crisscross ways, a feature of 
polycentric governance, it focuses on the skeletal frames that create the 
regional architectures.  
------ Figure 1 HERE –---- 
 
How do such governance architectures remain relatively coherent in a 
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particular region? Formal institutions have established certain legitimacy, 
although such can be contested. The question is: how does moving away from 
formal rules invest informal relationships with legitimacy to facilitate transit 
migration governance? This is especially relevant as informal governance ‘holds 
an aura of the covert and exclusive’. 79  Durable interactions could establish 
informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.’ 80 
Informality could gain legitimacy when unwritten agreements exist in the 
absence of formal rules, when they specify existing formal rules that are 
ambiguous, when they radically depart from existing formal rules but do not 
diminish the former’s existence,81 and when bureaucracies circumvent political 
limitations on their autonomy.82 In weak states where legislation is difficult to 
enforce institutionally, and decision-making is more contingent on a political 
regime’s ‘rules of the game’, such a repeated mixture of formal and informal 
relationships develops the fundamentals of mutual expectations and 
adaptation.  
The weakness of statehood in various world regions provides ample 
opportunities for informality to be legitimized in governing transit migration. In 
the absence of engagement from state authorities, international organizations, 
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such as NGOs, can take on more responsibility by providing services for those 
in transit. Even the activities of smugglers and militants can gain local 
legitimacy, because they challenge dysfunctional rules but do not diminish the 
existence of formal, governing institutions. 
The following empirical section unpacks the configurations of 
relationships in transit migration governance, represented through a snapshot 
in time (late 2010s). My framework does not rule out that different power-laden 
mechanisms could enter the social relationships and reshape actors’ behaviours 
over time. Especially informal relations can be relatively fluid. However, the 
durability of social structures that form the regional governance architectures 
may create obstacles to such new mechanisms entering or taking hold in 
governing. I draw on evidence from transit states on the Balkan route, 
particularly North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and 
Slovenia, part of former Yugoslavia. I further discuss the larger MENA region, 
focusing primarily on Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan as important transit states 
prior to and during the current forced migrations from Syria. I chose to compare 
relationships in these two regions, as they are part of the larger European 
neighbourhood and tackle similar transit migration flows primarily from Asia 
and the Middle East. In the Balkans, the countries of former Yugoslavia display 
post-communist legacies and a mixture of relatively weak and stronger states; 
in contrast, the Middle East contains competitive authoritarian or authoritarian 
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regimes, where state capacities are even weaker.83 I bring ample evidence from 
secondary sources derived from international and local media. 
 
The Balkans 
The Balkan region emerged out of violent ethnic warfare following the 
1990s collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, when large refugee flows spread to 
Europe, the Americas, and Australia. At the time they were primarily Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnians, and Kosovars. The 2014-2016 refugee wave was different. In 
2015 alone EU’s border agency FRONTEX registered close to 800,000 irregular 
crossings compared to 43,000 in 2014. 84  The bulk of refugees and transit 
migrants came from outside the region, mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Pakistan with the aim of reaching Western Europe. Migration during this 
period is associated with both mobility and immobility. Especially North 
Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia turned into transit states before the 
2016 closing of the Balkan route. Yet, a new route opened in 2017-2018 
encompassing Albania, Kosovo, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many 
migrants were left ‘stranded’ in parks, camps, and other public buildings, hoping 
to reach Europe but unable to move,85 despite their determination to keep 
 
83 The Freedom House Index (2019), measuring civil and political rights, lists states in the Balkans from ‘free’ (Croatia, 
Slovenia) to ‘partly free’ (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia); in the Middle East 
– from ‘partly free’ (Jordan, Lebanon) to ‘not free’ (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf countries) 
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores. The Fragile States Index (2019), measuring state capacities, 
finds Balkan countries to have stronger institutional capacities than those in the Middle East 
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going. As Gerard Knaus, founding chairman of the European Stability Initiative, 
argued, if someone has crossed five or six international borders already, they 
are not likely to give up crossing into the EU.86  
Several mechanisms underlie the configuration of transit migration 
governance in the Balkans, which can be briefly characterized as ‘reluctant 
gatekeeping while buck-passing’. Officially, these are asymmetric mechanisms 
of conditionality for future EU enlargement, linked to containment measures. 
The Balkan states’ role is to contain transit migration into Europe, or to facilitate 
it in official ways. Yet, another layer of informality and self-organization exists if 
one looks deeper. Transit migration is often informally tolerated among states 
with relatively weak institutions that pass the burden on to other states. On 
another scale, NGOs, holding a certain level of autonomy, take on transit 
migration by contesting dysfunctional state policies, or the lack of them. On 
another, clandestine level, smugglers, taking advantage of migrants’ desire to 
reach other destinations, face both official contestation and informal toleration. 
In this region’s architecture, relationships between transit states and sending 
states are minimal, while those with EU destination states are strong. 
Destination states are attractive to migrants because of either their formal 
policies or the informal knowledge among migrants of opportunities for family 
reunification and integration over time.  
 
86 Benjamin Bathke, ‘EU, NGOs Criticize Conditions in Bosnian Migrant Camps as Humanitarian Emergency Looms” 
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 EU Accession Conditionality with Transit Migration Containment 
Two asymmetric power mechanisms underpin the relationship between 
the EU and Balkan states: EU accession conditionality coupled with the 
containment of refugee and transit migration flows. In contrast to previous 
enlargement waves towards Eastern Europe, EU conditionality in the Western 
Balkans has been defined by the need to strengthen weak post-conflict states, 
through instruments embodied in Stabilization and Association Agreements. 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and 
Serbia signed such agreements, as did Croatia prior to joining the EU in 2013. 
While conditionality required Balkan states to meet certain thresholds of 
democratic standards to gain future membership, its long and tedious process 
effectively put the breaks on such enlargement. Conditionality eventually 
became an interventionist political process to ensure that reforms were 
introduced without many stand-offs against the EU.87 Especially the 2014-2016 
migration wave necessitated reforms to asylum and migration systems not 
introduced previously. The EU promoted its model of border management88 in 
the Western Balkans and required an update of local asylum systems. 
With the EU’s endorsement, in 2015 countries on the Balkan route 
opened a transit corridor for transporting refugees across their territories into 
 
87 David Chandler, ‘The EU and Southeastern Europe’, Third World Quarterly 31:1 (2010), pp. 69-85, p. 77. 
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Western Europe. Such policies were formalized, although it was unclear how 
refugees would transit legally under EU law.89 Transit was often justified on 
humanitarian grounds, especially in Serbia and Croatia, where empathy towards 
current refugees was linked to recent memories of refugees’ displacement 
during the 1990s wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration.90 Formal and informal 
practices worked hand in hand. Under UNHCR pressure, refugees were asked 
to express their intent to apply for asylum at border points and receive a ‘de 
facto transit visa’, called a 72-hour paper.91 While many expressed such intent 
officially, the majority did not file for asylum in these countries according to 
Dublin regulations, but pressed further towards Western Europe. On their part, 
although having adjusted to EU requirements, Balkan states justified their 
transit state status by discouraging refugees from remaining in their territories. 
As Croatia’s former Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic appealed to refugees: ‘You 
are welcome to Croatia and to pass through Croatia… But continue. Not 
because we don’t like you, but because this is not your final destination.’92 
Containment is not officially spelled out in EU documents, nor is it official 
vocabulary of Balkan states. Yet, it underpins this relational link in the 
governance architecture. In October 2015 EU and Balkan states adopted a plan 
to coordinate a response to the crisis. It included not only improving 
information exchange, registering migrants, and developing temporary 
 
89 Julija Sardelić, ‘From Temporary Protection to Transit Migration’, Working Paper 35, (Florence: RSC/EUI, 2017), p.15. 
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reception centres, but also deploying FRONTEX as a security arrangement 
available only to EU member-states at the time.93 Leaders of transit states were 
placed in a new lucrative position to ‘sell their services as proxy migration 
controllers’.94 As Geddes and Taylor observe, Balkan states ‘were not unwilling 
pupils’ to learn EU border practices. The Slovenian Ministry of Interior, for 
example, welcomed them as measures for the country’s EU integration, while 
simultaneously putting ‘restrictive provisions such as border controls’ in place. 
Ministries of interior of other Balkan states also benefitted from these 
arrangements.95  
Considering the discussed containment through conditionality, one 
usually thinks of a bifurcated relationship between power-holders of an 
asymmetric nature: the EU as a supranational institution imposing policies on 
less powerful Balkan states that try to adopt or evade them. However, looking 
deeper through the lens of polycentric governance, one can discern ways in 
which Balkan states retained some power to govern transit migration less 
formally. Prior to the 2014-2016 wave, migration-related agreements were 
signed to readmit persons residing without authorization in the EU, and to 
reintegrate returnees.96  Yet, Balkan states were ‘neither willing, nor able to 
 
93 BiEPAG, ‘Crisis’. 
94 Ferrucio Pastore, ‘Migration Policy Beyond Containment’, Stratfor Worldview, 21/04/2017. 
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process the number of asylum applications that could be potentially lodged by 
all the persons transiting through the region today’.97 Weak institutions make 
asylum systems easy to abuse when getting transit migrants to their desired 
destinations.98 In addition, Balkan states resorted to ‘push-backs’, not officially 
sanctioned, when authorities forcibly returned migrants to another state99 or 
pursued selective registration.100 Such practices somewhat contained transit 
migrants within the region, and passed the buck onto other states for dealing 
with them. They created tensions between Serbia and Croatia in 2015-2016.101 
Croatia’s strict EU border control resulted in a bottleneck in neighbouring 
Bosnia-Herzegovina towards the West, while Serbia did little to control transit 
migration flows.102 Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and reinforced 
border closures, Croatian police have been accused of spray-painting migrants 
with crosses when pushing back from Bosnia’s border with Croatia.103  
 
Transit Migration and Non-state Actors 
I argue that in the Balkans, where democratization processes have been 
in place for almost three decades, and strengthened due to EU conditionality, 
NGOs have gained some degree of autonomy, although not fully. Such relative 
 
97 Neza Salamon, ‘Asylum Systems in the Western Balkan Countries,” International Migration 54:6(2016), pp.151-63,p. 
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autonomy has been especially visible among Muslim-based NGOs, as they have 
operated in support of minorities in political environments where majorities 
have been primarily Christian, either Orthodox (North Macedonia, Serbia) or 
Catholic (Croatia, Slovenia). Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo are 
Muslim-majority states.  
Therefore relationships between NGOs and governments in transit states 
have been often based on the ability of such relatively independent non-state 
actors to cooperate or contest existing policies. Some have been grassroots 
organizations engaged in anti-systemic solidarity with migrants, while others 
have taken part in humanitarian relief operations alongside government and 
international organization guidelines. In this region, however, NGOs have had 
a rather independent voice when cooperating with one another or contesting 
authorities, thereby creating a layer of informal self-organization away from 
officially sanctioned policies. 
NGOs were often mentioned in the news in 2015 with their support of 
refugees passing through the Balkans. Civil society organizations quickly 
compensated for the initial absence of state-provided accommodation and 
services, erecting temporary refuges and providing meals, clothes, and legal 
services.104 They concentrated in places alongside the refugee route. There was 
an understanding that although refugees and other transit migrants may not 
permanently stay in the Balkans, their human rights should be respected while 
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they are there. In North Macedonia, Muslim and international NGOs were the 
first to engage, attracting hundreds of volunteers, many of whom contested the 
violent treatment of refugees by the state.105 Some launched local protests and 
advocated for policy changes, such as the LEGIS NGO that lobbied for the 
introduction of the above-mentioned 72-hour transit paper.106 In Serbia many 
volunteers joined domestic and international NGOs, while civil society 
organizations in Croatia vocally supported refugee rights. They also collected 
food, blankets, and other donations. Activists across the region cooperated with 
each other, but contested the strict security measures implemented to deal with 
the refugees.107  
Muslim organizations in the Balkans retained relative autonomy. Rexhepi 
observes, the production of European border regimes, mixed with 
Islamophobia, introduced a distinction between Balkan Muslims as secular 
populations and the ‘Islamists and Jihadists’ from outside Europe. State-
sanctioned Islamic institutions especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
North Macedonia labelled dissident congregations as ‘radicals’. Yet, Muslim 
community-based organizations and some mosques were more independent 
from their official denominations. Especially in North Macedonia in 2015, some 
Muslim NGOs rendered the strongest support for refugees. Humanitarian 
organizations such as Association Veli & Arif provided assistance and kept their 
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distance from official Islamic institutions. 108  Once the new transit route 
emerged in 2017-2018 to pass through predominantly Muslim countries such 
as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, it was derogatively called the 
‘mosque route’.109  
NGOs continued to play important role also during the ‘stranded’ phase 
of transit migration. In 2019 NGOs in Croatia, Serbia, and North Macedonia 
became alarmed that migrants had been exposed to illegal expulsions every 
day and been mistreated and humiliated.110 A lack of capacity to accommodate 
them has been especially grave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NGOs warned about a 
potential humanitarian disaster due to overcrowded camps and refugees 
sleeping in parks and squats.111 Besides pursuing advocacy, NGOs continued to 
fundraise for food and other donations. 
Smuggling networks have been operational at yet another, clandestine, 
level in the Balkans long before 2014-2016, as has been combatting them 
through various methods. When the transit corridor became official in 2015, 
migrants did not have to rely on clandestine smugglers to cross borders.112 
Their movement was officially facilitated towards the EU. Tackling migrant 
smuggling increased also with EU requirements to strengthen cooperation in 
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human trafficking. Such requirements were embedded in the EU Action Plan 
against human smuggling and demonstrated by joint actions, such as 
Operation Kostana 2015,113 whereby police forces of seven countries within and 
outside the EU jointly acted at the Serbia–North Macedonia border together 
with Europol.114  
Yet, in relatively weak Balkan states, challenged by minimal economic 
opportunities and corruption, it is not surprising that transit states have on 
occasion tacitly tolerated such activities. Smuggling is a booming business, 
worth €2 billion a year.115 For example, in the summer of 2015 a central Belgrade 
district had become a hub for transit migration, but authorities did little to 
remove the visibly operating human smugglers.116 Locals were also involved in 
supporting both migrants and smugglers, as witnessed on the Serbia–North 
Macedonia border.117  
Perkowski and Squire arrive at similar conclusions about the interplay 
between formal and informal interactions related to human smuggling. Their 
interviews with refugees and other migrants who traveled to Germany in 2015 
along the Balkan route recount that the latter experienced ‘considerable 
amount of organization and logistical support… from the very police forces that 
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would later impede others from traveling on’. 118  The authors question a 
conventional view that smuggling can be reduced by anti-smuggling measures, 
as there has been a co-relationship between both. Extraction of profit from 
people on the move has been pervasive, and a significant factor behind what 
the authors consider a failure of the European anti-smuggling agenda.119 
 
Balkan States in Relationship with Destination and Sending States 
Two mechanisms identify the relationship between Balkan states and 
destination states: initial cooperation through the formalized transit corridor 
and destination states’ own soft power of attraction. The formalized corridor 
had two immediate destination states within a close reach of the region: Austria 
and Germany, both part of the EU, therefore also implicated in overlapping 
migration-related governance. This corridor extended to Germany after 
thousands of refugees were stranded at the Budapest railway station in summer 
2015, and when Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that she 
would not close the country’s borders. 120  Most people transiting through 
Slovenia, also an EU country, did not ask for asylum there, but continued on to 
Austria. At the peak of the refugee wave in 2015, Austria had the third highest 
asylum applications in the EU, after Hungary and Sweden.121 Austria closed its 
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borders in January 2016, but remained attractive as a destination state, 
although it served as a transit state to Germany too. As Sardelic demonstrates, 
Germany was the most desired destination as it decided to examine asylum 
applications of third-country nationals whose first point of entry was not 
Germany.122  
Additional reasons made Austria and especially Germany attractive to 
refugees from the Middle East. Both countries had experience with hosting 
refugee-based populations from the wars of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
Geospatially, they were also closer to the Balkan region than Sweden, for 
example, a country considered by many Middle Eastern refugees an ultimate 
destination. Germany’s attractiveness was due to its open-door policy and ‘we 
can do it’ rhetoric.123 Young skilled workers were needed against the backdrop 
of an ageing population. 124  Austria also tried to lure refugees to fill job 
shortages, despite rising anti-immigrant rhetoric that has gained traction over 
time.125 Family unification was also a pull factor, as Germany has previously 
hosted hundreds of thousands of Afghani, Iraqi, and Syrians who have become 
diasporas. Germany was an end destination for many of the 2015 wave, evident 
in that most Syrian refugees have wanted to stay in Germany.126  
 
122 Sardelic, ‘Temporary Protection’, pp. 7-8. 
123  Markus Engler, ‘Germany in the Refugee Crisis’ 22/04/2016, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Warsaw 
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124 The Economist, ‘Looking for a Home’, 29/08/2015. 
125  The Local, ‘Austrian Employers Woo Refugees Amid Labour Shortage’ 27/01/2019, 
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The least pronounced relationships have been between Balkan states 
and Middle Eastern and Asian sending states where the migration wave 
originated. 127  Historically socialist Yugoslavia was part of the Non-aligned 
Movement, in which Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq were members along with 
other Middle Eastern states. After the Cold War only Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina retained observer status in this organization. Previously Balkan 
states had not been a destination for massive voluntary or forced migration 
from the Middle East. Therefore, although most of them had bilateral relations 
and embassies in the respective Middle Eastern capitals, their foreign policies 
rarely concerned migration and citizenship issues. The only more recent 
exception was Serbia, seeking to toy with influences alternative to that of the 
EU and to reinvigorate its relationship with Iran. This concerned Iranian refugees 
that had tagged along with the 2015 refugee wave from Syria. In 2017 Serbia 
opted for a visa-free regime with Iran, but less than a year later abolished it, 
citing abuse, as some were seeking to illegally enter the EU once they got to 
Serbia.128 Therefore, most of the Balkan states’ relationships with the sending 
states were indirectly influenced through their relationship with the EU. 
 
The Middle East 
 
127 Turkey has a strong influence in the Balkans unlike other Middle Eastern states, especially because of defending 
the Turkish and other Muslim minorities, and promoting Sunni Islam. However, Turkey isn’t discussed in this section, 
since it hasn’t been a sending state for migrants on the Balkan route during the current wave, unlike Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. 
128RFE-RL, ‘Serbia Ends Visa-free Travel For Iranians, Citing ‘Abuse’ By Some’ 12/10/2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-
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Violent conflict has recurrently displaced populations throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), many of whom have sought to transit to 
Europe or other global destinations. Especially the 1948 and 1967 Arab–Israeli 
wars, the 1971-1989 Lebanese civil war, the 1978 Iranian Revolution, the 1991 
Gulf War, military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, and the 
war in Syria since 2012 have caused massive population displacements. As most 
countries in the region are authoritarian and do not respect refugee rights 
detailed in the 1951 Refugee Convention, they also do not grant asylum. 
Historically a source of emigration, MENA states did not have the political will 
to accommodate immigration; thereby irregularity grew in parallel with 
immigration.129 This is how an international refugee regime’s power diminishes 
formally, opening up for substitutive informal relationships to kick in. 
Displaced populations can be bona fide refugees, whether given asylum 
or not. But they are rarely able to travel directly from their country of origin to 
their desired destination130 and often enter mixed flows of irregular migration. 
Asylum-seekers may remain in the transit state and seek to cross illegally into 
another state.131 Examples include more than 200,000 transit migrants bound 
for Europe but unable to reach it due to a lack of visas, and labour migrants 
employed in the informal sector without permits.132 Transit migration through 
 
129  Philippe Fargues, ‘Irregular Migration in the Arab Mediterranean Countries’, Middle East Institute, 4/05/2012, 
https://www.mei.edu/publications/irregular-migration-arab-mediterranean-countries, accessed 18/06/2020.  
130 Stephen Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries’, 
International Journal of Refugee Law 15:4(2003),pp.567-677. 
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the Middle East consists of mixed flows of people not only from the region, but 
also those from Asia and Africa. A large-scale 2017 survey among Palestinians 
and Kurds in Europe demonstrates that many in the now-established diasporas 
transited on their first journey through Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey and then 
through Greece on the Balkan route or through Malta, Spain, or Portugal.133 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan have been transit states for decades beyond the 
current Syrian warfare and deserve closer attention. 
The regional architecture of polycentric governance of transit migration 
in the MENA region is one where hierarchical and coercive power relationships 
dominate. These relationships are at the core of the formal and informal ‘rules 
of the game’, which shape actors’ expectations and the conditions of possibility 
they face when responding to transit migration. In contrast to the Balkans, 
where region-wide policies towards meeting EU enlargement norms and legal 
requirements define how states handle transit migration, EU policies in the 
MENA region are less unified regionally, but more target an individual country’s 
interests to entice them into gatekeeping. Hard bargaining dominates, whether 
through political compacts offering financial benefits for hosting refugees or by 
threatening to break such agreements to extract further benefits, most notably 
voiced by Turkey. NGOs have less autonomy, whereas smugglers are tolerated 
and militant groups can control specific territories and play a role in governing 
 
133 Maria Koinova, ‘Palestinian Diaspora in Europe: Data Trends from a Cross National Survey’, Paper presented at the 
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transit migration. In contrast to the Balkans, targeted destination states are not 
only European. Relatively remote geospatially, European destination states play 
a less pronounced role in this regional architecture than sending states. Sending 
states are often proximate or neighbours to the MENA transit states, entangled 
with them in historical conflicts that continue to the present day. Intrastate and 
international conflicts manifest in geopolitical alliances, which in turn shape 
transit migration governance.  
 
Transit Migration Containment through Special Deals and Compacts 
Transit migration governance in the MENA region has included states 
and international organizations. Pitea observes that the lack of formalized 
understanding of what constitutes ‘transit migration’ has manifested as legal 
treatment of irregular migration. This has been the case in Egypt, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Iraq, which adapted their existing policy instruments to counter 
irregularities.134 Such practices have been challenged by the UNHCR, which 
takes care of refugees, returnees, and internally displaced people 135  and 
advocates for a universal perspective of their rights. The IOM has taken on some 
roles reserved previously for the UNHCR, namely care of asylum seekers and 
refugee return.136 In 2002 the EU created a Dialogue on Transit Migration with 
Mediterranean countries for short-term cooperation to combat irregular 
 
134 Pitea, ‘Transit’,,p.6. 
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migration, and long-term development cooperation for better joint migration 
management. 137  These policies expanded and deepened over time. The 
following discussion focuses primarily on responses involving the EU, to extend 
the comparison with the Balkans.  
Containment as a mechanism underlies the relationship between the EU 
and Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Here it largely manifests through special 
deals and compacts based on a ‘tit-for-tat’ power relationship. Such deals 
involve large sums of EU financial transfers for humanitarian assistance to Syrian 
refugees, in exchange for tightening border controls, curtailing illegality, and 
breaking smuggling networks. Rather than being passive recipients, transit 
states have engaged in ‘refugee rentierism’,138 seeking to obtain bargains from 
the EU that go beyond funding the refugees.  
Such deals were also enabled by transit states not subscribing to the 
1951 Refugee Convention. 139  The transit states may abide by customary 
international law not to return refugees to places where their lives would be 
endangered (non-refoulement principle), but they still treat them 
idiosyncratically, and much more informally compared to transit states in the 
Balkans, legally bound by the refugee regime. Turkey has given a temporary 
protection status to Syrian refugees, but not to other refugees. Syrian refugees 
 
137 EU, ‘Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration’, Migration and Home Affairs, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/dialogue-mediterranean-transit_en,  
138 Victoria Kelberer, ’Negotiating’, Middle East Policy 24:4(2017),pp.148-165; Sahin-Mencutek, ‘Governance’, Tsourapas, 
‘Syrian Refugee’. 
139 Turkey is part to the 1951 Refugee convention and the 1967 Protocol, but applies it only to refugees from Europe. 
Prof. Dr. Maria Koinova, ‘Polycentric Governance of Transit Migration,’ Review of International Studies, 
accepted version, 21 October 2021 + author’s information 
 39 
were initially labelled as ‘guests’, but such favourable treatment vanished when 
competition for jobs and scarce resources increased.140 Lebanon has applied 
some provisions from the Refugee Convention voluntarily, but is reluctant to 
recognize refugees especially from neighbouring states, and shifts 
responsibility for them to third parties, notably the UNHCR.141 Jordan has no 
national legislation governing refugee matters, but has similarly cooperated 
with UNHCR to register refugees.142  
Conditionality as a mechanism underpinned initially Turkey’s 
relationship with the EU. For an entire decade until the 2016 special deal, EU 
policies included increased scrutiny of the country’s human and minority rights 
performance and rule of law, similarly to processes related to the Western 
Balkans. A visa-free regime for Turkish citizens, originally contemplated as part 
of such EU’s conditionality, did not materialize. Controlling borders and 
migrants mobility was part of the relationship between EU and Turkey prior to 
the 2016 deal.143 However, the 2016 deal was a step-change. It was deployed 
as a tool of crisis management, a humanitarian action jointly operated with the 
EU in the context of the larger conditionality. Turkey’s foreign ministry 
considered the deal successful as it brought additional funds,144 although EU 
 
140 Burcu Torgal Koca, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey’ New Perspectives on Turkey 54(2016),pp.55-75. 
141 Maja Janmyr, ‘No Country for Asylum’’, International Journal of Refugee Law 29:3(2017),pp.438-463. 
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accession negotiations were frozen in late 2016 due to Turkey’s growing 
authoritarianism. 
In essence the deal envisaged the containment of illicit migration on a 
transit journey to Europe. It sought to prevent irregular migration flows from 
crossing into the EU, and to return to Turkey third-country nationals who 
manage to cross illegally. The EU promised €6 billion in assistance for the 
Syrians in Turkey. As Soykan argues, ‘Turkey wanted the money and the EU 
wanted Turkey to stop migration to Europe, so the government [of Turkey] 
became the gatekeeper that kept Syrians in Turkey.’ 145  Turkey is currently 
hosting over 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees146 in government-run camps 
and self-accommodation in urban areas. In response to the deal, 1,582 third-
country nationals, including 279 Syrians, were resettled in Turkey.147 The deal 
also thwarted temporarily individuals’ intentions for further transit either by 
rendering going to Europe less desirable148 or by offering job opportunities that 
made some abandon their early plans to move.149  
The deal was initially considered a success, yet border externalization did 
not proceed as intended. 150  Crude power politics set in, fostered by 
authoritarian practices. When in 2019 arrivals from Turkey grew in Greece, 
 
145 Quotes by Netherlands Helsinki Committee, ‘Defending Human Rights in Turkey: Cavidan Soykan’, 28/08/2019. 
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Turkey slowed down procedures to readmit third-country nationals. 151  It 
retained its hard-bargaining power by occasionally threatening to open the 
border to Europe for refugees.152 It even delivered on this threat more recently, 
when in February 2020 Ankara suddenly stopped blocking refugees passing 
into Europe. As a result hundreds of refugees arrived at the borders of Greece 
and Bulgaria.153  
EU’s compacts with Lebanon and Jordan did not entail an enlargement 
conditionality mechanism, but offered the hosting of Syrian refugees in 
exchange for financial benefits. Thereby the compacts ‘bilateralized’ EU’s 
neighbourhood policy beyond its original intentions to ‘create a level-playing 
field’ among countries aspiring for membership. 154  The Lebanon Compact 
facilitates the refugees’ temporary stay, while the Jordan compact seeks to 
create more job opportunities. Through the Lebanon Compact, the EU pledged 
€400 million (2016-2020) for education, youth, medicines, solid waste, counter-
terrorism, job-creation, and legal aid for both Lebanese and refugees. 155 
Through the Jordan Compact, the EU pledged €747 million (2016-2017) for 
humanitarian aid, social inclusion, micro-finance, justice and political reform, 
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and creation of 200,000 jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens in 
exchange for relaxed conditions to export Jordanian products into the EU.156  
Although both compacts have a different substance, they both aspire to 
contain onward migration towards Europe by emphasizing the self-reliance of 
Syrian refugees and creating incentives to prevent transit.157 As a EU diplomat 
put it: ‘The main objective… is to stabilize refugees, so that they don’t move on 
to Europe. This is done through “development projects,” such as investments in 
infrastructure and community-based projects’. 158  The two compacts also 
solidified local tendencies to increase border controls. Until 2014 Lebanon had 
an open border policy for Syrian refugees, while Jordan limited entry specifically 
for Palestinians from Syria.159 The EU’s approach coupled refugee governance 
with security, border management, and development concerns, seeking to 
safeguard its own security. 160  This helped transform ‘the norm of burden-
sharing into a practice of migration containment’.161  
However, such measures were ineffective. Containment of transit 
migration may have been officially agreed upon, yet fragile statehood creates 
conditions for informality to thrive. Concerns for exploitation, mismatch 
between labour skills and demands of local economies, detention, deportation, 
 
156 European Commission, ‘EU-Jordan Partnership: The Compact’, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
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and human rights abuse162 created conditions for further migration, including 
transit. Also, the porous borders of these fragile states facilitated transit or illicit 
migration. In Lebanon formal state agencies are not always present in border 
areas. 163  Nor are information systems available at all border-crossings, 
especially with data concerning non-Lebanese citizens. 164  Jordan also has 
porous borders, facilitating the transfer of people and weapons from 
neighbouring states, including Syria.165 Moreover, a 2019 UNHCR survey of 
Syrian refugees revealed that 75% of them intended to stay in the host-country, 
while 20% openly considered moving onto a third country with a  ‘transit 
migration’ mindset.166 Such a gap between official policies and refugees’ actual 
intentions opened up further space for informality, discussed shortly. 
 
NGOs and Other Non-state Actors 
In polities with authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regimes in the 
MENA region, NGOs provide a major share of the humanitarian aid and refugee 
services. While officially retaining some autonomy, many are still co-opted in 
their relationship with transit state institutions, and often serve as their 
extended arms. From a polycentric governance perspective, such a relationship 
tilts decision-making power towards state authorities, while actors adjust to 
 
162 Sahin-Mencutek, ‘Governance’, Lenner and Turner, ‘Refugees Work’, Jagarnathsingh, ‘Global Migration’. 
163  Jamil Mouawad, ’Lebanon’s Border Areas in Light of the Syrian War” Florence: EUI, 2018,pp.8. 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/52564/RSCAS_PR_2018_03.pdf?sequence=1 
164 Jagarnathsingh, ‘Global Migration’,p.41. 
165 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).  
166 UNHCR, ‘Fifth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria’, March 2019, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68443.pdf 
Prof. Dr. Maria Koinova, ‘Polycentric Governance of Transit Migration,’ Review of International Studies, 
accepted version, 21 October 2021 + author’s information 
 44 
such formal and informal power asymmetry. Such a trend is especially visible in 
Turkey as a centralized state with growing authoritarianism. Although the 
number of associations increased with Turkey’s democratization in the 2000s, 
mutual distrust between state and civil society organizations prevails, especially 
after the crackdown following the 2016 attempted coup d’etat. Numerous 
NGOs criticized that ‘the government has its favored organizations and 
cooperates only with them’. 167  As Sahin-Mencutek argues, the most active 
NGOs tackling what the state presented as a humanitarian emergency were 
close to the government: the Turkish Red Crescent, having a semi-state status 
foundation, and the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief.168 INGOs also needed permission from either central or 
provincial authorities and had to rely on government data to deliver services,169 
or were subjected to heavy monitoring.170 NGOs stepped in to deliver language 
education, but mostly those aligned with the government were sponsored to 
work on large projects.171 Refugee-based organizations also emerged, but were 
mostly organized in informal charitable and religious networks. They avoided 
challenging the state, because of the refugees’ legal precarity and temporary 
arrangements.172 Hence, although there was a period when Turkish civil society 
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gained more independence, after 2016 state and non-state actors had to adjust 
to the government’s regaining decision-making power over refugees and 
transit migrants. 
Jordan and Lebanon have also sought to co-opt NGOs, although more 
indirectly, since in these countries responsibility for the protection of refugees 
and their ultimate departure has been heavily transferred onto UN agencies. 
Formal and informal relationships factor in UNHCR’s role in refugee 
governance, to the extent that some consider it a ‘surrogate state’.173 In Jordan 
NGOs partnering with the UNHCR have collaborated with ministries and 
municipalities for service delivery. But they act carefully when lobbying relevant 
ministries, reluctant to question their policy positions and fearful of being 
denied access to refugee camps or other areas. 174  In Lebanon, where the 
UNHCR has traditionally played a stronger role, co-opting of NGOs has taken 
place more indirectly: by restricting the UNHCR’s right to register refugees after 
2015, and by making it difficult for NGOs to rely on UNHCR data and support 
the delivering of humanitarian services.175 Moreover, Western-funded NGOs 
often compete with sectarian-based networks, especially in Lebanon where 
another non-state actor, the militant Shia organization Hezbollah, has 
ubiquitous presence.176  
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Transit states in the MENA region also have an uneasy relationship with 
smuggling networks. In 2019 Turkey made headlines by formally breaking up a 
smugglers’ ring operating in four Turkish provinces; the ring was connected to 
Ukraine, Greece, and Italy and had helped Iraqis, Afghanis, and Syrians cross 
into Europe by land and sea.177 Iranians have also transited through Turkey due 
to its visa-free travel. However, undercover research has shown that human 
smugglers are tacitly tolerated while operating openly in cafes in Istanbul, 
although occasionally experiencing police raids and court cases. One of them 
argued: ‘The state turns a blind eye to the flow of migrants. Of course they 
know… But the migrants are a great source of income for Turkey... Our trade is 
a great support for the national wealth, because every migrant who enters 
Turkey leaves behind between 3,000 and 10,000 Euros’.178  
Similarly, official policies have restricted smuggling in Lebanon and 
Jordan, yet informally tolerated it as part of corrupted practices. Entering 
Lebanon has been almost impossible without smugglers’ aid, while restrictions 
on work permits has facilitated migrants to become part of ‘clientelist 
structures’ in a ‘vivid black market of fake sponsors, brokers, employers and 
contracts’.179 In Jordan, Syrians commonly pay smugglers to bypass Jordanian 
security forces when fleeing the camps.180 The demand for transit migration, 
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especially among Iraqis, has created business opportunities for local Jordanians 
who have set up bogus travel agencies or added smuggling to their open 
businesses to bring foreign domestic workers from Asia.181 
As in the Balkans, it is counterintuitive and also illegal institutionally to 
include smugglers within the architecture of transit migration governance. Yet 
it exists informally in the MENA region as well, not least because it does not 
threaten the transit states’ political order and informally benefits them. 
 
Relationship with Destination and Sending States 
As discussed earlier, significant migrations originating in the Middle East 
transit to Europe via the Balkans. Hence, similar destination states with relatively 
open asylum regimes – such as Germany and Sweden – exercise soft power to 
attract those in the Middle East. Germany recently became highly attractive to 
Syrian refugees because of the earlier discussed openness of its borders, 
opportunities to file for asylum regardless of point of entry, and relatively quick 
integration of refugees into businesses and other programmes. Sweden has 
been attractive to Middle Eastern war-ravaged populations because of its 
openness to refugees, at least until recently, and its welfare system.182 Family 
unification plays an important role as well.  
However, since the geospatial distance to EU borders, especially from 
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Lebanon and Jordan, necessitates several transit stops, the appeal of European 
destination states has been more diffuse than in the Balkans. Transit migrants 
have considered other global options and negotiated destination states along 
their journey. 183  Other destinations in Canada and Australia have gained 
importance. Well-off Syrian refugees in Turkey, for example, have paid 
smugglers €9-10,000 to reach Europe, €12-13,000 for the UK, and €15,000 for 
Canada, while some have transited through Cuba, Brazil, or South Africa.184  
In the MENA governance architecture, formal and informal relationships 
between transit and sending states are bilateralized and entangled in historical 
conflicts, where close geospatial proximity shapes how transit migration is 
governed. Such relationships often transpire in shifting alliances through power 
politics among ethnic groups or political factions within fragile states and 
beyond. Nowhere is such a trend clearer than in Lebanon, where political party 
alliances for and against Syria divide local actors because of Syria’s occupation 
of Lebanon until 2005. Supportive of Assad’s regime in Syria, the militant Shia 
organization Hezbollah in Lebanon (on the terrorist list internationally but 
considered a party locally) has been the least welcoming towards refugees in 
areas under its control. This is in contrast to other local actors with more 
oversight over Christian- and especially Sunni-inhabited areas.185  
 
183 Chatelard, ‘Iraqi Asylum’.  
184 Cicek, ‘Behind the Scenes’. 
185 Alexander Betts, Ali Ali and Fulia Memisoglu. ‘Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis’, (Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Centre, 2018),p.10. https://www.refugee-economies.org/assets/downloads/Local-politics-of-syrian-refugee-
crisis_report-web.pdf 
Prof. Dr. Maria Koinova, ‘Polycentric Governance of Transit Migration,’ Review of International Studies, 
accepted version, 21 October 2021 + author’s information 
 49 
Thus, although scholarship tends to think of Lebanon as a transit state 
making decisions about migration governance in its territory, confessional 
groups and non-state actors exercise significant informal yet de facto capacities 
to selectively govern. This governance is not universal regarding refugees and 
other transit migrants, but is defined by the actor’s regional alliances, amities, 
and enmities. For example, Lebanon’s and Jordan’s historical conflicts with 
Palestinian exiled movements has resulted in specific treatments of Palestinian 
refugees during the current Syrian warfare. Lebanon refused to allow Syrian 
refugee camps to be constructed altogether, to avoid repetition of the 
Palestinian experience of building temporarily camps that turned permanent, 
and enacted high border restrictions on Palestinian entry. 
Turkey’s relationship with its neighbours to the east is further shaped by 
instability and wars. Turkey became a transit state for a large wave of Iranian 
refugees after the 1979 revolution, and those fleeing Iraq and Kuwait after the 
1991 Gulf War.186 Turkey’s tensions with Syria, Iraq, and Iran have existed over 
colonial and water politics, Turkey’s role in NATO, secessionism, and the 
political activism of mobilized Kurds seeking territorial self-determination from 
Iraq, Iran, and Syria, besides Turkey. Turkey has also been involved in the recent 
war in Syria, in combating the Syrian government, and in international alliance 
politics seeking to defeat the Islamic State. As discussed earlier, Turkey became 
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one of the main countries to host Syrian refugees and other mixed migration 
flows from this conflict region. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
demonstrate the effect of all these conflicts on Turkey’s transit migration 
governance. Yet it is important to emphasize that recurrent conflicts along 
Turkey’s eastern and southern borders make them more porous towards large 
flows of refugees and illicit migrants, including those from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.187 Thus, although there are official policies 
to govern migration within Turkey, a constant influx of mixed migration flows 




This article advances a novel way of thinking about regional architectures 
of transit migration governance: a relational perspective on polycentricity. It 
advocates for a shift away from thinking in institutionalist terms, underpinning 
the study of migration regimes and regime complexes, but to consider that such 
governance takes place both formally and informally through power-laden 
social relationships among four sets of actors in a particular region. These 
operate polycentrically and on different scales: international organizations, 
non-state actors, and destination and sending states.  
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My approach emphasizes the importance of informality in building and 
sustaining regional governance architectures. These do not offset institutional 
governance arrangements, but either supplement or do not challenge them. 
Aside from governments and international organizations, the relevant actors 
adapt to a region’s mixture of formal and informal relationships, shaped by 
political regimes and capacities of the states in which they are embedded. The 
article provided ample empirical evidence from both the Balkans and the 
Middle East. 
I also identified that migrants, when exercising agency in their own 
governance, can enter such social relationships. Migrants can become part of 
NGOs, be private actors or participate through informal networks. For space 
limitations, empirical engagement with migrant agency has not been at the core 
of this article. Future research could delve deeper into this problematic, through 
migrant-based interviews, and ascertain how much migrants’ behaviours are 
shaped by existing social relationships and the established governance 
architectures, and how much they themselves shape and challenge these 
effectively.  
This article brings novelty to the larger literature on polycentric 
governance. Existing scholarship on polycentric governance focuses little on 
migration politics per se, and the larger IR literature still emphasizes primarily 
the emergence of formal rules among various actors. This article demonstrates 
that rule-based and informal arrangements often coexist in transit migration 
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governance, and appeals to open our analytical tools to capture such mixed 
phenomena. Also, as argued elsewhere, such a relational perspective could be 
applicable also to other policy areas where formal institutions are absent, are 
new, weak or existing rules are difficult to implement. This could concern a 
variety of policy areas such as environmental politics, economic standardization, 
humanitarianism, other aspects of migration and diaspora politics, as well as 
Internet governance, among others. Finally, by examining the varieties of 
power-laden relationships that underpin the regional architectures of transit 
migration, this article also responds to recent calls within the broader 
scholarship on polycentric governance,188 to think on the role of power in more 
systematic ways. 
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